automatically evoke the "special concern" necessary under a discretionary standard to compel the appointment of an independent representative. Because of the competing [*1388] notions of parens patriae and family autonomy, n24 and the skepticism with which such allegations tend to be received by judges, however, this is not the case. Possible sexual abuse in a custody dispute does not uniformly trigger the appointment of counsel. Discretion allows some children who may have been sexually abused to go unrepresented. n25
For example, in Sucher v. Sucher, n26 a Minnesota appeals court upheld a trial court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent three children in a custody battle. n27 Despite allegations and some evidence of sexual abuse, the trial judge's failure to appoint a representative was held not to be an abuse of discretion. n28 The child's story vacillated during an in camera interview and was therefore considered insufficient evidence to trigger the discretionary standard. n29 While the child's role in this case was critical, counsel was denied based on the court's opinion that all the circumstances of the children had been fully litigated and that there were no alternatives which a guardian could have presented. n30
II. WHY REQUIRE INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION?
Children must be provided with independent representation whenever allegations of sexual abuse are made because neither the judge nor the child's parents can adequately represent the child's interests. For the child, fundamental bodily and psychological integrity is at stake. "Independent representation by counsel [whenever the child's welfare is at stake] is the most significant and practical reform that can be made in the area of children and the law . . . reform should be directed at [permitting] all interested parties --including children --to have independent counsel." n31
As stated earlier, the substantive law guarantees all children in divorce cases the right to custody determinations made in their best [*1389] interests. n32 The resolution of sexual abuse allegations will significantly shape the judge's assessment of the child's best interests. n33 Yet the difficulties of proving sexual abuse n34 are exacerbated by the divorce context and, therefore, abuse is often not legally established despite significant physical and psychological evidence. n35 The ramifications of an erroneous decision --either ordering continued contact when a child is in actual jeopardy n36 or constraining the relationship with a falsely accused parent n37 --make improved procedural standards at both the fact-finding and disposition stages essential in order to meet the statutory best interests mandate. n38
Mandatory legal representation will ensure that the child's voice is heard. n39 Representation is the sole procedure which assures that [*1390] all matters of law will be available for the determination of the child's best interests. n40 Without independent representation, the child, whether an actual victim of incest or not, risks needless abuse by the legal system charged to protect her best interests. Even if sexual abuse is not ultimately proven, n41 the allegations themselves generate the need for representation because of the physical, psychological, and emotional probing of the fact-finding process. Any court adjudicating claims of sexual abuse without the participation of the child's advocate is relying on indirect, secondary evidence from parents, psychologists, and physicians. It is curious that when the potential harm to a child is so great, the judicial system would grant such importance to secondary evidence "when direct evidence is so easily obtainable. The best interests of a child can best be determined on the basis of objective, independent evidence . . . made available to the court [by] independent counsel." n42
The family court forum in which a judge considers allegations of sexual abuse made during divorce proceedings poses unique problems for the sexually abused child which necessitate according the child the extra procedural protection of a voice. n43 Family courts are traditionally concerned with the equitable distribution of property and the reasonable access of both parents to their children. In fact, good faith allegations are insufficient summarily to halt continued contact with an alleged abuser. In "normal" divorce cases, preserving the continued contact of children with both parents is justifiable. When a child is subjected to sexual molestation, however, continued contact is exceedingly harmful. n44
Sucher v. Sucher n45 demonstrates the potential dangers of a system in which appointment of independent Page 3 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383 , *1387 representation is discretionary. The trial judge is not in a position to determine whether the [*1391] child's circumstances, from the child's point of view, have been fully litigated. Rather, the advocate for the child, who is obligated to represent the child's interests, should make this determination. As the court stated in M. M. v. R.R.M., n46 when "the missing element [is] vigorous, independent representation of the children by counsel," the record available for the trial judge will be "woefully incomplete." n47 Finally, the discretionary standard is an inadequate safeguard when the consequences of a wrong decision are as devastating as those following incest. n48 The legal representation of children is one affirmative step that can help the legal system operate in favor of abused children. While independent legal representation does not promise a complete solution to the dilemmas posed by sexual abuse allegations in divorce cases, the appearance of an attorney for the child may help a judge make "reasoned determinations of fact and . . . disposition." n49 Suspected victims of sexual abuse need the "assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, [and] to insist upon regularity of the proceedings." n50 In order to determine the best interests of children, the child's voice must be heard in all cases in which sexual abuse is alleged.
III. THE ROLE OF THE CHILD'S REPRESENTATIVE
Ambiguity about the attorney's role in family litigation has emerged as an important issue in recent years. n51 The role of children's [*1392] counsel is often undefined and, consequently, hotly disputed. n52 Should she play the role of a guardian ad litem, who determines what is best for a child, n53 or that of an advocate, who is obligated to present the wishes of her client? Also, should the child's representative, regardless of role, be required to be an attorney?
In order to ensure that the child's voice is heard in court, a representative should be an advocate who will advance the child's position and not make independent judgments of the child's best interests. n54 An advocate, unlike a traditional guardian ad litem, n55 insures that the child's voice is heard with full force in legal proceedings. To be effective, such an advocate should also be a lawyer. n56 The following credo characterizes the role the attorney should play:
[*1393] We are, first, lawyers charged with representing clients. . . . [E]ven though our client may be young, when he or she is capable of exercising minimal judgment we will represent the client's position to the court. . . . We will not represent a position to the court that is contrary to our client's wishes. . . . We do not believe that it is appropriate for [us] to assume the function of the court. . . . n57
The court ultimately is responsible for the child's best interests: "the trial court does not function solely as an arbiter between . . . private parties [but must] determine what . . . would best guarantee an opportunity for the children involved to grow [in]to mature and responsible citizens." n58 A preliminary assessment by an advocate of these best interests usurps the judge's authority and prejudices the determination. While social and psychological expert testimony aids the judge in her determination of the child's "best interests," the child's voice must be heard and must inform any truly valid determination.
The child's advocate should represent only the interests of the child, and not consider the competing claims of the parents in the custody case. Once a parent's claim affects the representation, the child effectively has lost her advocate. For example, even when a child expresses terror and pleads with her "advocate" not to send her to an alleged abuser, the counsel who is affected by parents' concerns may fail to oppose visitation. n59 In this scenario, what force does the child's voice really have? Who protects the child from the lawyer, and why have a lawyer at all? n60
When the attorney is guided by her conception of a child's best interests and not by the voice of the child, interest conflicts or diminished representation may be overlooked. For example, in one parental [*1394] rights termination proceeding where abuse was alleged, the "advocate of the child's best interests" standard permitted the dual representation of two children whose wishes were diametrically opposed. One child wanted to return to her mother while the other child did not. n61 Because the children's counsel's role was to advocate the children's best interests, however, the Iowa Supreme Court found no "actual" conflict. n62 Furthermore, because it was a juvenile proceeding, the court was unwilling to presume prejudice from the dual representation "even if under ordinary [criminal] standards a substantial possibility of conflict would be shown." n63 Standards proposed jointly by the American Bar Association and the Institute for Judicial Administration expressly reject the traditional guardian ad litem model of representing children and urge advocacy of the child's interests. n64 In protective proceedings "where the juvenile is capable of considered judgment on his or her own behalf, determination of the client's interests in the proceeding should ultimately remain the client's responsibility." n65 The introduction to the Standards claims that this model of the lawyer-client relationship is necessary to achieve fundamental goals of the legal system, including enforcement of the child's substantive rights and facilitation of accurate determination of factual and legal issues through the adversary process. n66
Whenever there is suspicion that children have been sexually abused, representation by an attorney acting as an advocate should be required. n67 Any legislation requiring representation must clearly [*1395] delineate the responsibility of the child advocate in order to provide all incest victims the voice needed to protect their interests.
IV. ADDRESSING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDEPENDENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION

A. Parens Patriae
Children in private custody battles where sexual abuse is alleged currently must rely on judicial discretion for independent legal representation. n68 Parens patriae, a derivative of English common law, is often used as a spearhead against the use of children's advocates; the notion is that "[t]he king should protect all who have no other protector, that he is the guardian above all guardians . . . . The king's justices see no great reason why every infant should have a permanent guardian, because they believe that they can do full justice to infants." n69 Many judges believe that the parents' representatives and the "independent investigative powers and duties of the court . . . adequately protect the children's interests and renders unnecessary the extra expense and delay of cases by court appointment of counsel to independently represent the children." n70 According to the parens patriae doctrine, children do not need independent legal representation because their interests are protected by the court itself. The legal system relies heavily on this premise. n71
As noted in a Bill of Rights for Children, it is an anomaly that children in any divorce proceeding are unrepresented. "The major disputed issue may be their custody and visitation rights, and in a very real sense, they may be the principal parties in interest since the ultimate issue . . . is their welfare and best interests." n72 This argument has greater force when sexual abuse is alleged, because the court [*1396] decides not only which parent will have custody but whether or not the child's body and mind will continue to be invaded. Regrettably, these children are legally no more entitled to a "voice" than children in any other custody dispute.
If the victim of incest is to realize her right to legal protection, her story must first be heard. n73 As a Milwaukee family court judge who has instituted the appointment of guardians ad litem in all disputed custody cases has noted: When two terriers fight over a bone, the bone does not join the fighting. But a child is not a thing or an object to go as a prize to the winner of a contest . . . . The whole future life of the child will be affected by the court's decision . . . . Will such basic interests of the child be adequately represented or even presented to the court by the attorneys for the warring litigants? . . . Is not a minor and dependent child whose parents are involved in a divorce case entitled to . . . representation [similar to that given to a child in a tort or probate action] at least in those cases in which custody becomes a matter of dispute between the parties or concern to the court? n74
Judges who serve as protectors of children's social and legal interests sacrifice impartiality. n75 The composite voices of social psychologists, physicians, parents, and young children upon which judges may rely cannot equal the autonomous legal voices of children themselves. n76 Professor Laurence Tribe recognized the potential limits of wise and benevolent paternalism, stating:
If the universality of the childhood experience . . . could guarantee empathy from adult lawmakers despite the absence of children from legislative assemblies, there would be no occasion to regard children as an isolated and unrepresented minority in need of special protection; but if adults instead look with contempt at a stage they have "outgrown" and will never re-enter, then every privilege withheld . . . from the young must become a source of suspicion. n77 [*1397] In order to ensure the vitality of the legal system, judges must recognize that today's children may view situations such as custody and visitation in unique and unprecedented ways. The need for an individualized voice is critical in this context because determinations are based on the best interests analysis, and society lacks a consensus regarding what is "best" for children. n78 Thus, when the consequences of a disposition may be irreparably harmful, as in the case of sexual abuse, n79 individualized children's voices must be heard. Independent legal representation that articulates the voice of each child is the best way to accomplish this objective.
B. Familial Privacy
Another obstacle to the independent representation of allegedly abused children in private custody cases stems from a perception of the American family as an autonomous "private government" with protected interests. n80 Because children legally are incapable of determining what is in their best interests, and parents legally are presumed competent to represent their children's interests, appointing counsel for children is often seen as infringing on parental rights. n81
Society protects the right of individuals to marry, n82 to procreate or not to procreate, n83 and, increasingly, to define themselves as [*1398] "families" for many purposes. n84 Families may protect themselves against state intrusion by invoking constitutionally protected rights of privacy. n85 It is incongruous, however, to restrict the exercise of such rights to traditional family units while ignoring the individual rights of children from shattered families. n86 The theory of the family as an inviolable unit presumes that the family is intact and can be counted on to protect its members. n87 When divorce and abuse disintegrate the family social unit, viewing the family as paramount may fail to protect the child. n88
Parents embroiled in custody disputes involving allegations of abuse are particularly inappropriate representatives of their child's welfare or wishes. n89 When one parent alleges sexual abuse by the other, the accused parent's judgment and parental fitness is questioned. n90 [*1399] As an interested party, each parent should be presumed incapable of presenting a voice that contradicts his or her own. n91 Neither parent can be relied upon to speak for the child; consequently, an extremely deferential approach to the parents is no longer viable. For this reason, the child's voice must be heard in order to procedurally protect her best interests. This need outweighs competing concerns. n92 To assume that the parents' attorneys have covered the entire agenda ignores the reality that "in countless circumstances a juvenile's rights and interests . . . are at sharp variance with those of his parents." n93 The possibility of abuse and allegations of such certainly constitute one of those circumstances. Indeed, "[w]ithout a separate advocate, the court may not perceive the existence of the special needs of the child." n94
V. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION
This Comment has argued that when sexual abuse is alleged, a statutory commitment to a best interests determination requires the procedural protection of independent legal representation for a child. In addition to the best interests rationale, reform in the private custody dispute context may be based on analogous statutory authority or on constitutional grounds. Ultimately, finding constitutional authority is less important n95 than sensitizing courts and legislators to the need of every child for independent counsel when allegations of sexual abuse are asserted. In the end, however, judicial discretion is too slim a reed upon which to rest the right to be free from sexual molestation. Legislators have already recognized that when the state alleges abuse, a child must be provided representation. [*1400] This right of representation must be extended to include the children in private custody disputes who are possible victims of abuse.
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A. Analogy to State-Initiated Investigations of Abuse
When a state alleges abuse, the child who is the subject of the custody proceeding is generally statutorily guaranteed representation. Such a guarantee is strongly supported by the federal government, particularly in cases of child sexual abuse. n96 The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act n97 conditions the granting of federal funds for the handling of child abuse cases on a state's provision of a guardian ad litem to represent the child in "every case involving an abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding." n98 State statutes commonly require that when the state alleges abuse, [*1401] the child must be provided with independent representation. n99 The federal and state governments, however, have not extended this right to the many potentially sexually abused children in private custody disputes. Given Congress' express recognition of the importance of representation in sexual abuse cases brought by the state, the different treatment of children in private cases is unjustified. Their interests are coextensive with those of children in state-initiated proceedings.
One might attempt to draw distinctions between sexual abuse proceedings initiated by the state and those which are not, in an effort to argue that the child's need for representation is less critical in a private custody dispute. As demonstrated below, these distinctions are specious.
The Veracity of Allegations Made in the Divorce "War"
There is a commonly held assumption that allegations of sexual abuse made by "warring" spouses are more likely to be false than allegations made by a state agency. n100 Based on this assumption, the need for procedural safeguards, such as independent representation, is perceived as less critical in private custody disputes. Recent studies have shown this assumption to be unfounded:
The number of sexual abuse charges arising during divorces and/or custody/visitation disputes are small in number, only a very small percentage of even the contested cases.
The number of cases involving such allegations has increased in recent years, as have sexual abuse reports in the general population. . . . At present, there is no evidence to suggest that allegations arising at the time of divorces or custody disputes are more likely to be false.
[*1402] Deliberately false allegations made to influence the custody decision or to hurt an ex-spouse do happen but they are viewed by knowledgeable professionals as rarities. n101
Society doubts the truthfulness of the allegations because "[i]t is an easier psychological rationalization to believe that an ex-spouse would make up these charges to get even than it is to believe that a parent would molest his own child." n102 Articles suggesting that children are frequently "brainwashed" by vindictive spouses to believe that they were molested, have misled legal and clinical decisionmakers. n103 Because of feelings that allegations of abuse are likely to be false, courts may ignore such allegations in making custody determinations. n104 This harms both the protective parent and the abused child. As one observer noted, "[w]hat we really need to be stressing to the legal and mental health community is to look at each case as an allegation of child sexual abuse and ignore the fact that there's a custody battle going on . . . . That, in and of itself, will probably tell you very little." n105 Ensuring that the child's independent voice is heard is one method of counteracting misperception regarding abuse in custody disputes.
Societal Stereotypes About Incest
Distinguishing sexually abused children in private custody disputes from those in state-initiated proceedings also may be attributed to general reluctance to believe that incest sweeps across the socioeconomic spectrum. The tragic death of Lisa Steinberg in New York City chillingly illustrated that child abuse is not solely an incident of poverty or lack of education. n106 The erroneous assumption [*1403] that one can assess sex abusers by "type" n107 --Page 7 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383, *1400 education, wealth, or other socioeconomic factors --means that legislators and judges are less likely to view accusations levelled in the divorce context as truthful. n108 When abuse proceedings are initiated by the state, they more typically involve parents and children of lower socioeconomic levels. Reporting patterns significantly obscure the economic and social distribution of child abuse. A poor family in a clinic or emergency room setting is far more likely to be suspected, evaluated, and reported than is an affluent family whose child is treated in a private practitioner's office. n109 In less affluent neighborhoods, child protection agencies are more likely to learn of potential danger to the child, to force the family into the child protective system, and to provide the child with representation. In short, abuse, including sexual abuse, is less likely to be detected by the state if the family is of moderate or substantial economic means. As a result, some allegations of sexual abuse may come to the state's attention only when the parties are engaged in a custody dispute. Unfortunately for these children, their right to representation is often denied simply because their abuse is revealed during a private custody dispute. n110
[*1404] B. Constitutional Authority
Children clearly possess certain constitutional rights. n111 The scope of these rights, however, is unclear. Professor Tribe has noted that children's rights, like those of "discrete and insular minorities," are difficult to safeguard because they are not represented in the legislature. n112 Although there may be reasons to treat children differently from adults at times, children's rights prevail over competing considerations when the issue . . . involves the exercise of a right we have come to regard as constitutionally 'fundamental,' such as the right to bodily liberty or the right to be heard in one's own defense. . . . [W] hen such a right is at stake, the general fact of youth alone cannot automatically justify the right's abridgement. n113
Sexual molestation is an invasion of bodily liberty and integrity. Just as a person has a right to refuse medical treatment n114 and a right to be free from forced sterilization, n115 each individual has the right to be free from incestuous sexual molestation. n116 A child's right to [*1405] be heard in "self-defense" is as critical a protective measure in a sexual abuse case as in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. All children who are suspected sexual abuse victims and who are the subjects of private custody disputes have important interests which are weighty enough to warrant explicit consideration in a constitutional analysis.
A due process argument that children in divorce custody cases are constitutionally entitled to representation may be based on In re Gault. n117 This landmark case established a minor's right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings which may result in commitment to an institution. n118 While the Court limited its decision to a determination of a juvenile's entitlement to counsel in delinquency proceedings, n119 the case has been the impetus for extending the legal rights of minors. n120
Ordinarily, the requirements of procedural due process apply only when there is a threat to life, liberty, or property, as protected by the fourteenth amendment. n121 Gault expressed such a strong belief in the critical role of counsel in the American judicial system, however, that many commentators have argued that the right of counsel in Gault is independent of the type of interest affected. They assert that this right will eventually extend beyond those cases involving a deprivation of liberty to all judicial proceedings involving children. n122
In any case, a child has a liberty interest in remaining in her family's custody. The Supreme Court has recognized that family [*1406] relationships are interests which entitle parents to due process. n123 The Court has also stated that liberty encompasses the right to establish a home, bring up children, and to "enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness." n124
Just as a parent's liberty is affected by state decisions concerning her relationship with her child, a child's liberty is similarly affected. Therefore, the liberty interests of both the parent and the child must be protected by due process of law. The Second Circuit noted this reciprocity of rights in stating:
This right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of both parent and children. It is Page 8 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383 , *1403 the interest of the parent in the "companionship, care, custody and management of his . . . children . . . and of the children in not being dislocated from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association," with the parents. n125
A child's right to representation is derived from this right to continued parental contact, and its exercise guards against unnecessary disruption of parent-child relationships. In the context of state-initiated custody proceedings, it has been recognized that: "[t]he physical liberty interest of a child in a neglect proceeding is sufficiently similar to the liberty interest of a child in a delinquency proceeding to require the same right to counsel." n126 Similarly, it has been noted that: "[a] change of parental bondage during the tender years is hardly less upsetting of one's pattern of life than is the denomination and possible commitment of a child as a 'juvenile delinquent.'" n127 While the representation of allegedly abused children [*1407] in state-initiated proceedings is governed by statutes, it is frequently argued that such a procedure is constitutionally compelled. n128 If resting on constitutional grounds, the right ought to extend to private proceedings as well. The child's interest in a continuing relationship with a non-abusive parent is no less important when another parent, rather than the state, seeks effectively to terminate the relationship.
In all private custody disputes, cognizance of the constitutionally protected interest in family integrity begs the question of whether all children have a constitutionally protected right to be free from state interference with an ongoing parent-child relationship. Arguably, the court has no authority to inhibit a child's relationship with a non-custodial parent unless that relationship would cause the child articulable harm. n129 One commentator has suggested that even when the institutionalization or foster care of a child is not contemplated, the child's liberty is always invoked by a change in custody, because of the potential deprivation to the child of the company and control of one parent. n130 While a child does not normally have the liberty to choose her custodian, when a situation arises which calls for a judicial choice, failure to consider the child's [*1408] voice is arguably a denial of liberty under the fourteenth amendment. n131
When sexual abuse is alleged, however, the liberty interests implicated are yet greater than those in general private custody disputes. Because a parent-child relationship is far more imperilled when sexual abuse is alleged, the child's liberty interest merits the same procedural safeguards in such cases as in state-initiated proceedings. While the potential for harm is generally less in private custody cases than in juvenile delinquency cases, this is not true of private custody cases in which sexual abuse is alleged. All allegations of child sexual abuse raise the need for the procedural protection of independent counsel to represent the suspected victims.
CONCLUSION
The nation has declared war on the critical social problem of child abuse, particularly sexual abuse. Because establishing sexual abuse in private custody disputes is so complex and difficult, and because the consequences of erroneous determinations are so pernicious, an attack on child abuse which does not include the private forum is incomplete.
In private custody disputes, the child's dual interests in avoiding continued molestation and in maintaining healthy relationships with non-abusing parents merit legal recognition. Because those interests differ from the parents' and are insufficiently protected by parens patriae, they warrant separate legal representation.
Whether or not it is recognized as constitutionally compelled, the present statutory and judicial commitment to making custody determinations that are in a child's best interests mandates the independent legal representation of all children when sexual abuse is alleged. This will not eradicate the damage done to victims of sexual [*1409] abuse; it can, however, provide a means for reducing the damage by insuring that the victim's interests are not neglected.
"The legal profession is the one most identifiable group in control of our nation's destiny. It must lead the way in providing for the needs of helpless children whose lives are tangled in the law." n132 The independent legal representation of all children who are suspected victims of sexual abuse is a vital step towards tipping the scales of Page 9 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383 , *1406 justice in the children's best interests.
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n68 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (describing the discretionary standard as the current state of the law). n70 Chalupa v. Chalupa, 220 Neb. 704, 705-06, 371 N.W.2d 706, 707-08 (1985) .
n71 See Legal Rights of Children, supra note 7, at 677 n.14 (noting current American law).
n72 Foster & Freed, supra note 2, at 355. Pa. L. Rev. 1383 , *1409 n80 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965 (reserving a constitutionally protected sphere of privacy within a family). The view of the family as a private "corporation" dictates that the state will do everything to support the unification of the family. Therefore, it is rare for a court to deny visitation rights even if there is known physical and sexual abuse of the child. See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 149 (D. Sonkin ed. 1987). n81 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 48, at 9-14 (discussing the legal status of children); Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 121-22 (1984) (arguing that because the best interests test makes virtually all aspects of a parent's life relevant, a child advocate may probe into "deeply held secrets" which parents have privately agreed to keep out of the court's consideration).
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